Introduction
A belief that the application of science to the solution of practical problems represented a sure foundation for human progress has represented a persistent theme in American intellectual and economic history [26, 64~. During the two decades following
World War II this belief was seemingly confirmed by the dramatic association between the progress of science and technology and rapid economic growth. The technological revolution in American agriculture, the growth of industrial productivity, the contributions of science to military and space technology and the virtual elimination of the business cycle seemed to reinforce this perspective.
By the late 1960's, however, the formula which had permitted the U. S. to move into a position of scientific, economic, and political leadership in the world community was faced with both . A view has emerged an intellectual and a "populist" challenge to the effect that the potential consequences of the power created by modern science and technology--as reflected in the cataclysm of war, the degradation of the environment, and the psychological cost of rapid social change--are obviously dangerous to the modern world and to the future of man. The result has Professor in the Department of Agricultural and and in the Department of Economics and Director Development Center, University of Minnesota.
been to seriously Applied Economics of the Economic question the significance of scientific progress, technical change, and economic growth for human welfare.
Three Generalizations
In my judgment the response by economists to the challenges posed by these concerns has been overly defensive. Nevertheless, it seems useful to re-emphasize certain considerations that have frequently been ignored in the heat of the challenge to economic thought and economic policy. Let me summarize my own perspectives in the form of three generalizations.
First, man has, throughout history, been continuously challenged by the twin problems of (a) how to provide himself with adequate sustenance, and (b) how to manage the production and disposal of what, in the recent literature, has been referred to as "residuals"--and in less elegant language as garbage~43~.
Failure to make balanced progress along both fronts has, at times, U imposed serious constraints on society's growth and development .
The current environmental crisis represents, in my view, one of those re-occurring times in history when technical and institutional change in the treatment of residuals has lagged relative to progress in the provision of sustenance, conceived in the broad sense of the material components of consumption.
Second, in relatively high income economies the income elasticity of demand for the commodities and services related to sustenance is low, and declines as income continues to rise; 'W while the income elasticity of demand for more effective disposal .It does seem clear that any analytical system that will improve our capacity to arrive at an operational definition of -scarcity must be capable of integrating physical and bi010gical information with economic, social, and behavioral knowledge on both the demand and the supply sidell. This is an essential step in the establishment of priorities for investment and management.
In addition to the conceptual difficulties there is a basic lack of data about the eco-system. My own reading of the literature leads me to the conclusion that no one knows, with any useful degree of precision, the extent to which the basic metabolic pro- been that firms are motivated to save total cost for a given output; at competitive equilibrium each factor is being paid its marginal value product; therefore, all factors are equally expensive to firms; hence there is no incentive for competitive firms to search for techniques to save a particular factoa.
The major weakness of this argument was the failure to recognize that the process of technical change is, itself, a resource using activity. It is now clear that much of scientific research, and also clearly support the conclusion that the enormous changes in factor proportions, and in factor productivity, represented a process of dynamic factor substitution associated with non-neutral changes in the production surface induced by secular shifts in relative factor prices. In both the United States and Japan the progress of public sector agricultural research has been powerfully directed by the conditions of resource supply and product demand to the extent that these forces were reflected through factor and product markets. There is also evidence to suggest that in recent years, when the implications of market forces in both factor and product markets implies that if the price of a factor input is zero (or close to zero) that factor input will be used until the value of its marginal product approaches zero. This will occur even though the marginal social product may be negative. In an environment characterized by rapid economic growth technical change, induced by relative factor prices, will result in a bias in the direction of technical change.
As a result,the demand for the resource that is priced below its social cost will grow more rapidly than in a situation where substitution possibilities can occur only along a "given" production surface. As a result,the "common" resource, the capacity of the environment to absorb residuals for example, will undergo stress more rapidly than in a world characterized by a constant level of The capacity of the social system to achieve substantial increases in performance will depend on its ability to achieve productivity growth--to identify new and more efficient sources of growth in the supply of social and environmental amenities 1:7:}.
Agriculture, for example, can never again release as many workers to other sectors of the U. S. economy as it released during the last four decades. It can never again serve as a "leading" growth The public sector has traditionally experienced great difficulty in generating support for research designed to produce social change.
There has been an implicit acceptance of the Marxian view that the "mode" or the technology of production should dominate social organization [9, 50] . Let me attempt to clarify. When society invests in plant or in medical science research it anticipates that it will obtain a pay-off in terms of technical change--higher national average crop yields and lower mortality rates. When society invests in social science research~it anticipates that the results will contribute to the "conservation" of existing social institutions.
Yet radical changes in family life, religion, and in social and economic organizations have clearly been induced by the sharp decline in the cost of population growth resulting from advances in agricultural and health technology. These changes serve to identify the public health and agricultural scientist, not the economist, the psychologist, the sociologist, or the political .scientist, as the major source of radical social change in our
time. Yet, the easiest way for a social science research project to get its budget cut off is to consciously design a research program to produce social change. This "head in the sand" approach to institutional innovation, with its pretense of ethical neutrality, is exceedingly costly to society and may be dangerous to the future of man ~25, p. 217-7.
Fourth, as a general system of environmental management the regulatory approach is a dead end. [45], Stigler [79] , and institutions" [7, p. 298] .
